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The debate on the adoption of the reform of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has taken a 
bitter turn in the last few weeks. Several 
environmental NGOs as well as the Greens group 
at the European Parliament publicly expressed 
their concerns with the compatibility of the new 
CAP system with the objectives defined by the 
European Green Deal. The Commission shared 
part of those concerns and seemed unhappy with 
the negotiating positions of the Council of the 
European Union and the European Parliament, to 
the point that Vice-President Timmermans 
suggested in an interview that the Commission 
could even consider withdrawing current 
proposals, which were presented in 2018 by the 
Juncker Commission. The German Presidency of 
the Council, other national ministers and several 
EP members reacted bitterly to Timmermans’ 
suggestion, and the Commission quickly 
backpedaled. President von der Leyen argued that 
while withdrawal of a legislative proposal ‘is 
always a legal and institutional possibility’, the 
Commission was not considering it, and was 
confident that the proposed regulations could 
have been adequately improved during the 
legislative process. 
Leaving aside the substantive debate – whether 
the proposals should be withdrawn – we want to 
discuss (expanding on the brief reflections that 
one of us has already expressed here) whether a 
decision to withdraw in these circumstances 
would be legal, and more generally the limits to 
the Commission’s power to withdraw legislative 
proposals. In what follows, we aim to show that 
there are different scenarios in which the 
Commission may lawfully withdraw its proposals 
and that the precise threshold to be met in each of 
these scenarios is arguably different. 
 
An implied power to withdraw legislative 
proposals? 
The starting point of an analysis of the 
Commission’s power to withdraw its legislative 
proposals starts from the text of the EU Treaties. 
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However, a cursory reading of the relevant 
provisions immediately reveals that no such 
power is explicitly conferred on the Commission. 
Article 17(2) TEU and Article 293(2) TFEU only 
explicitly refer to the power to make and the 
power to amend (legislative) proposals. If a 
power to withdraw proposals exists it must then 
be an implied power, that is, either implied 
through a broad conceptualisation of the power to 
make or amend proposals, or else implied as a 
distinct power next to the powers to make and 
amend proposals. 
For a long time, this legal question was purely 
academic: the Commission routinely withdrew 
(outdated) proposals, but as none of the other EU 
institutions or Member States took issue, the 
limits to the implied power to withdraw proposals 
remained untested. In 2013, however, the 
Commission withdrew a proposal against the 
wishes of the co-legislators, following which the 
Council of the EU brought a case against them 
before the Court of Justice of the EU, challenging 
the Commission’s decision to withdraw the 
proposal. In that Macro-Financial Assistance 
(MFA) case (C-409/13), the Court, for the first 
time, had the opportunity to confirm the existence 
of the Commission’s power to withdraw 
proposals and to sketch the limits governing that 
power. As we will show however, the current 
scenario concerning the CAP proposals is not 
entirely comparable to the one in MFA. Instead it 
would be a third scenario, in addition to the two 
scenarios which can be identified in MFA. While 
that third scenario is subject to the same general 
logic, a different ‘triggering threshold’ arguably 
applies. 
 
The Two Scenarios following the Macro-
Financial Assistance case 
The question in MFA was whether the 
Commission has the power to withdraw a 
proposal even after the co-legislators have 
reached an informal agreement on a compromise 
text. All the institutions agreed that the 
Commission could withdraw proposals for 
‘administrative’ reasons, for example when 
proposals become obsolete or when the 
legislators have ignored a proposal for years. As 
in those cases there is an agreement between the 
EU institutions that these proposals no longer 
serve a purpose, the Commission routinely 
withdraws them and will announce this in its 
yearly work programme (see for example Annex 
IV of the 2020 Work Programme). Yet, the 
Commission had for a long time also claimed that 
it has the power to withdraw proposals based on 
substance (see answers to Questions 2422/86 and 
E-0858/01). The Court in MFA ultimately 
confirmed this, but subjected this power to strict 
requirements: 
i. the power can only be exercised up until 
the Council of the EU has acted 
(paragraph 74); 
ii. the Commission must give reasons for the 
withdrawal (paragraph 76); 
iii. in substance, the Commission must be 
able to show ‘cogent evidence or 
arguments’ (paragraph 76) of an 
objective need to withdraw the proposal 
and; 
iv. the Commission must respect the 
principle of sincere cooperation 
(paragraph 83). 
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In the specific MFA case, the Court found that 
there was an objective need to withdraw the 
proposal, because the amendments that the co-
legislators were contemplating distorted the 
proposal in such a manner that the achievement 
of the objectives pursued by the proposal was 
prevented, ultimately depriving the proposal of its 
raison d’être (paragraph 83). In those 
circumstances, the Commission was indeed 
authorised to withdraw its proposal. 
Following MFA there are therefore at least two 
scenarios in which the Commission may validly 
withdraw proposals: when proposals become 
obsolete and when proposals are unduly and 
fundamentally altered by the (co-)legislator(s). 
Coming back to the current CAP scenario, there 
is no question that it is different, and that it cannot 
be directly answered on the basis of the Court’s 
earlier findings. In the current situation, the key 
issues stem from the original Commission 
proposal, and not from amendments planned by 
the other institutions. Clearly, the same four 
requirements would also apply to this scenario. 
But what should be the precise threshold for 
triggering the power? Below we will develop two 
brief lines of argument, in favour alternatively of 
a higher and a lower threshold than the one 
resulting from MFA. 
 
Withdrawing the CAP proposals requires a 
higher threshold to be met 
To appreciate why a higher threshold should 
arguably be met in order for the Commission to 
lawfully withdraw its 2018 CAP proposals, it is 
useful to go back to the logic underlying the 
Court’s decision in MFA. As noted, in MFA the 
Court took the middle ground between the 
position advanced by the Commission, which 
argued that the rules governing its right of 
withdrawal fully mirror those governing its right 
of initiative, and the Council’s, which reduced the 
role of the Commission to that of an honest 
broker. While only the AG was explicit on this, 
the Court’s decision was thus also inspired by a 
concern to uphold the Community Method. The 
Court had to tread carefully since endorsing the 
Commission’s position would have resulted in a 
significant limitation on the powers of the two 
institutions with greater democratic legitimacy. 
Even the Court’s middle ground was criticised as 
‘not taking democracy seriously’.  Indeed, the 
only reason why the Commission should be 
allowed to subvert a compromise reached 
between the two institutions that incarnate the 
EU’s dual democratic legitimacy (see Article 10 
TEU) is when such a compromise would 
fundamentally go against the general interest of 
the EU which, under the Community Method, it 
is the Commission’s task to uphold. 
Applying this logic to the 2018 CAP proposals 
reveals why the threshold is higher. If the 
Commission would want to withdraw its 
proposals it must mean that they suffer from such 
fundamental deficiencies that they cannot be 
remedied  by the Parliament and Council of the 
EU any longer in the three readings under the 
OLP. Yet under the principle of sincere 
cooperation, the Commission should give an 
opportunity to the co-legislators to rectify the 
problematic aspects of its proposal or show that 
these are not rectifiable beyond any doubt. Of 
course, a new Commission can have new policy 
priorities but this cannot give a new Commission 
a free pass to withdraw proposals at will. Instead 
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the Commission would have to show that less far-
reaching action, such as simply amending the 
proposal, would not be effective to uphold the 
general interest. 
In addition, the fundamental deficiencies can 
arguably only result from two causes giving rise 
to an ‘objective need’ to withdraw: either the 
current Commission believes that its predecessor 
manifestly and fundamentally misconceived the 
EU’s general interest when drawing up the 
original proposals, which would equate to a 
misuse of powers by the preceding Commission; 
or the Commission believes that the political, 
economic and social context has fundamentally 
changed between 2018 and now. Under the duty 
to state reasons the Commission would thus first 
have to demonstrate the existence of either of 
these two situations and it must show the 
impossibility for the co-legislators to salvage the 
proposal. 
Having to show that your institution’s original 
proposal is fundamentally deficient and 
unsalvageable (either because of a misuse of 
powers or because of fundamentally changed 
circumstances) then arguably constitutes a higher 
threshold than having to show that certain 
amendments contemplated by the (co-
)legislator(s) would fundamentally alter your 
proposal to the point that its original raison d’être 
would be subverted. 
 
Withdrawing the CAP proposals requires a 
lower threshold to be met 
A good starting point for arguing in favour of a 
lower threshold is the Court’s understanding of 
the role of the Commission in the legislative 
process. In the MFA judgment, the Court of 
Justice not only explicitly acknowledged the 
existence of a right to withdraw legislative 
proposals – it also rejected the ‘honest broker’ 
reading of the role of the Commission proposed 
by the Council (see point 27 of the AG’s Opinion 
in C-409/13). In paragraph 74 of the ruling, the 
Court stated that ‘the Commission’s power under 
the ordinary legislative procedure does not come 
down to submitting a proposal and, subsequently, 
promoting contact and seeking to reconcile the 
positions of the Parliament and the Council’. As 
argued earlier, this can be seen as a defence of the 
Community Method and of the role of the 
Commission within it. This broad understanding 
of the Commission’s position in the legislative 
process stands in clear contrast to the view 
presented by the five MEPs in the CAP case that 
‘the role of the Commission must be to facilitate 
an agreement between the parties and not push its 
own political priorities’, and serves as the 
background for arguing in favour of lower 
thresholds in our case. 
According to the Court, one of the key reasons for 
reading the Commission’s power broadly is that 
the latter institution has the fundamental task of 
promoting the ‘general interest’ of the Union 
(Article 17), also when it comes to the legislative 
process. The general interest of the Union will 
normally be promoted by initiating new 
legislation, but again, in limited circumstances, 
might also call for withdrawing legislative 
proposals. This is the case when, as in MFA, 
amendments of the legislators have disrupted the 
raison d’être of the original proposal. But it may 
also be the case when the Commission reassesses 
the legal and political context and considers that 
the proposal no longer contributes to pursuing the 
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general interest of the Union. Even if the raison 
d’être of the proposal is not at stake, the fact that 
the circumstances surrounding the proposals have 
changed could therefore constitute an ‘objective 
need’ and justify the decision to withdraw. The 
Commission’s argument could therefore be that 
the current CAP proposal does not promote the 
‘general interest’ any longer, as it (allegedly) 
conflicts with the environmental objectives 
defined in the European Green deal. The need to 
ensure consistency between policy areas can also 
be considered part and parcel of the 
Commission’s duty to promote the Union’s 
general interest, and further supports a lower 
threshold for withdrawal in the circumstances we 
are discussing. 
Furthermore, one should be mindful of the 
institutional background to the dispute. The 
original proposal was presented by the previous 
Commission, the Juncker Commission. While the 
von der Leyen Commission first endorsed the 
initiative for reasons of institutional continuity, it 
should arguably be allowed to rethink and realign 
its priorities, even when this might upset the 
legislators. In general, it seems appropriate to 
leave the Commission room for even more 
political considerations when what is at stake is a 
proposal presented in a different term, also taking 
into account the broader trends towards a 
‘politicisation’ of the European Commission that 
have emerged more clearly in at least the last 
decade. This understanding would also support 
lower thresholds in the current case. 
A final aspect that distinguishes the CAP scenario 
from the MFA case, and calls for a lower 
standard, is that the decision to withdraw would 
be taken at a different and earlier stage of the 
legislative process. In MFA, the Parliament and 
the Council of the EU had already reached an 
informal agreement on the final text of the 
regulation under discussion. A Commission 
decision to withdraw the proposal at that stage of 
the process should rightly be seen as exceptional, 
also in view of the democratic concerns presented 
earlier. In the CAP case, negotiations are still 
ongoing, and a Commission decision to withdraw 
the proposal (and introduce a new one) would not 
amount to subverting a compromise between 
institutions, but would only modify the starting 
point of those negotiations. In other words, it is 
arguable that the democratic concerns would not 
be felt as strongly in the CAP scenario. 
 
Conclusion 
In the previous sections, we have presented two 
different views on the thresholds that should 
apply to any decision to withdraw the CAP 
proposals. Starting from the same set of 
requirements, which we deduced from the MFA 
decision, we reached different conclusions on 
how to apply them in the concrete case, and we 
believe that both views are indeed at least 
plausible. Should the bitter political dispute 
between the institutions evolve into a full-scale 
judicial battle before the Court of Justice 
(something unlikely to happen), the judges in 
Luxembourg would have a tricky and complex 
case in front of them. 
More broadly, cases like this raise more 
fundamental questions of a true constitutional 
nature, as Advocate General Jääskinen correctly 
pointed out in the MFA case. They make us reflect 
on the position of the Commission in the EU 
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legislative process and more broadly in the EU 
institutional balance. They also call into question 
the right balance between the democratic 
principle established in Article 10(2) TEU and the 
more ‘functionalist’, if not technocratic, idea of 
the Community Method reflected in Article 17(2) 
TEU, and crucially in the Commission’s (almost) 
monopoly on presenting legislative proposals. 
Both are prerequisites for the EU to function, but 
the right balance between the two remains an 
open question. The Court did not fully answer 
these fundamental questions in its MFA decision 
– perhaps for good measure – but they are bound 
to reach Luxembourg again sooner or later. 
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